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ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that Arthur Fine and Martin Heidegger present re-
sponses to the dispute between realism and antirealism that are remarkably close 
in character. Both claim that this dispute arises from a failure to take seriously 
our everyday experience of things in the world. I argue that it is useful to note 
the similarity between Fine and Heidegger for two distinct reasons: 1) their view 
provides a viable alternative to the current realist/antirealist dispute–an alterna-
tive that has not been given its due, and 2) it allows us to build a bridge between 
two seemingly distinct traditions.
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“There remains a subject whose professed aim is to ‘explicate’ science, 
which means we are not supposed to change science, but to make it 
clearer. The call for clarity is raised without any attention to the problems 
of the scientist… [The] machinery [of explication] soon gets entangled 
with itself (paradoxes of confirmation, counterfactuals, grue), so that the 
main problem is now its own survival and not the embalming of sci-
ence…That this struggle for survival is interesting to watch I am the last 
one to deny. What I do deny is that physics or biology or psychology or 
even philosophy can profit from participating in it” (207)
Paul Feyerabend, “Let’s Make More Movies”
I. Introduction
The dispute between realists and antirealists in the philosophy of science 
has been a heated one on both sides of the English Channel. Analytic and 
Continental philosophers alike have been engaged in attempting to sort 
out the ramifications and implications of scientific practice. Camps have 
been formed, sides demarcated, ink spilled. Despite Arthur Fine’s proc-
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lamation, in the 1980s, that “Realism is dead,” it seems still to thrive in 
various philosophical pockets: its defenders still write, its critics still read. 
Likewise, the antirealist challenge to realism has not conceded an inch.
To any on-looker, the dispute might well seem intractable. Realists 
insist that the remarkable success of science secures—or, minimally, ought 
to secure—its veracity. Antirealists insist that the history of science is proof 
enough that this cannot be so. Indeed, the very terms of the dispute suggest 
that a reconciliation of the two positions is impossible: realism is the view 
that the vocabulary of science corresponds, at least in outline, to the actual 
structure of the world as it is exists independently of human cognition. That 
is, the realist thinks that scientific theories pick out real entities1, where 
‘real’ is understood to mean ‘independently existing.’ The antirealist, on the 
other hand, insists that our scientific vocabularies are simply one more way 
to describe the world—that they have no privileged access to the structure 
of things: in the end, science offers yet another optional vocabulary that 
cuts up the world in a certain way, and for certain purposes.
Thus stated, the dispute does indeed seem intractable. This intrac-
tability is frustrating to virtually everyone involved—particularly when 
we recognize that there are extremely bright people on both sides of this 
theoretical divide—each insisting that their version of things is the one we 
ought to adopt.
To respond to such an intractability, there are in general three options: 
first, one can examine all arguments and determine which set of arguments 
(if any) is the more persuasive, opting for the side of the dispute with the 
better arguments. While this sounds nice in theory, it is much harder to do 
in practice than is typically thought—particularly when the debate is pop-
ulated by clever, or even brilliant, philosophers. As a second option, one 
can claim that the positions in question are not intractable because they 
are, at bottom, the same position. This is the strategy often employed in 
the freewill/determinism debate: the allegedly intractable dispute is shown 
to be no dispute at all. This has the happy consequence that everyone is 
right—even if not entirely clear about their theoretical commitments. The 
third option has precisely the opposite result: one can claim that everyone 
is wrong—that both sides make a crucial mistake, and hence that both 
sides ought to be abandoned.
1 It is now common to distinguish theory realism from entity realism. Theory realism 
claims that the general law-like features of a theory correspond (at least approximately) 
to the structure of reality—even if some of the details are incorrect. Entity realism, on the 
other hand, claims that the entities postulated in scientific practice correspond to actual, 
metaphysical entities. For the purposes of my discussion, this distinction is not of much 
importance. The claims about realism that I am making apply to both sorts of realism.
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While this third option is not likely to win me many allies, it is this 
one I will employ. I will do so using the work of both Arthur Fine and 
the early Heidegger. Both of these philosophers think that realism and 
antirealism stem from an attempt to characterize ontology in a way that is 
independent of human experience (Fine speaks of our ‘natural ontological 
attitude,’ Heidegger claims that ontology is only possible through phe-
nomenology). The way to get beyond this dispute is to limit our theoreti-
cal activities (Fine says we should not go beyond the core position of this 
attitude, Heidegger claims that human existence is the starting point for 
understanding the being of entities encountered in the world). My aim in 
the following pages is to spell out in detail what these views share, as well 
as the relevance they have for our thinking about realism and antirealism. 
Specifically, I will claim that Fine’s position is in essence a Heideggerian 
view of ontology. The Natural Ontological Attitude (or NOA) is nothing 
more than a recognition of the reality of things as they appear to human 
beings, concernfully absorbed in the world. To theorize about ontology in 
a way that goes beyond our phenomenology is to do philosophy irrespon-
sibly. It is doing philosophy irresponsibly, I will contend, that generates a 
realist/antirealist dispute. This is the thesis that both Fine and Heidegger 
share.
The importance of this discussion is twofold. First, it enables us to 
appreciate the insights of both realism and antirealism without thereby 
falling prey to the mistakes inherent in these philosophical positions. Sec-
ond, the approach I am taking allows us to see some significant overlap 
in two traditions that are often seen as standing at complete odds with one 
another.
II. Fine’s (and our) Natural Ontological Attitude
In the mid-1980’s, Arthur Fine published a series of articles problema-
tizing the debate between realists and anti-realists (Fine 1984, 1986a, 
1986b). The solution to the problem was, bluntly speaking, to abandon the 
problem. Fine claimed (and continues to claim) that we should set aside 
our disputes about how best to interpret the status of the sciences from a 
point of view external to its daily practice, and to take science on its own 
terms—accepting its results in much the same way as we accept that there 
are tables and chairs in everyday life.
To put this point otherwise, Fine argues that we should abandon the 
positions in the philosophy of science known respectively as ‘realism’ 
and ‘antirealism.’ As theoretical postulates concerning the status of our 
scientific theories, Fine contends, these positions are misleading at best. 
In effect, to advocate either position is to add theoretically ungrounded 
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assertion to what we all already accept. By refusing to theorize about our 
theories, and by moreover sticking to what Fine calls a ‘core position’ of 
truisms, we can move beyond realism and antirealism. Fine’s natural on-
tological attitude (NOA) is just such a refusal. As Fine puts it:
NOA helps us to see that realism differs from various antirealisms in this 
way: realism adds an outer direction to NOA, that is, the external world and 
the correspondence relation of approximate truth; antirealisms (typically) 
add an inner direction, that is, human-oriented reductions of truth, or con-
cepts, or explanations. (NOA,1203)
To advocate NOA is to advocate the core position—and no more. It is to 
advocate the truism that scientific investigation picks out real things in the 
world. Fine insists that we do not go beyond NOA—that we give up try-
ing to theoretically characterize our acceptance of a basic ontology. Such 
attempts at theorizing lead us to misrepresent the phenomena in question.
Realism and antirealism alike see science as susceptible to being set in con-
text, provided with a goal, and being made sense of. And what manner of 
object, after all, could show such susceptibilities other than something that 
could not or did not do these very things for itself? What binds realism and 
antirealism together is this. They see science as a set of practices in need of 
an interpretation, and they see themselves as providing just the right inter-
pretation. (NAE, 61)
Of course, it is open to one to reject Fine’s claims here and insist that we 
can be realists (or antirealists) because we have good arguments in favor 
of this position (or the other). Fine obviously recognizes this. Part of his 
argumentative strategy, then, is to show us that the arguments we typically 
employ in favor of realism and antirealism cannot work—and that they, 
moreover, will fail to work in principle.
Fine’s arguments against realism, I think, are his most persuasive 
(and probably the most intuitive as well). Consider, by way of illustration, 
Fine’s response to the claim that the approximate truth of science is the 
only thing that could explain its staggering success. Fine’s response to 
this argument is twofold. First, Fine notes that the so-called ‘staggering 
success’ of science is questionable at best. If we were to examine the total 
experiments conducted just yesterday, we would find staggering failure. If 
the realist insists that, overall, science has been successful, we can point 
to the fact that every theory (up to now, we might grant) has not been suc-
cessful. Thus, we have good inductive evidence that our current theories 
are false.
A typical response to this pessimistic induction is to note that the suc-
cess of science about which we are here talking is the ability to accomplish 
tasks with our scientific theories. Here, there is much that is amazing: 
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airplanes, atom bombs, computers, the internal combustion engine, and so 
forth. But if it is the instrumental success of science that is meant to justify 
realism, we face a large explanatory gap. Let me elucidate.
Fine claims that, no matter how successful science is, it is still su-
perfluous to insist that science actually corresponds to the structure of the 
world. To explain the success of science, we only need to postulate that 
science is instrumentally correct, not that the elements of our theories (or 
the entities we postulate) actually correspond to things ‘out there’ in the 
external world. As Fine puts it, “if it is the instrumental success of science 
that we think wants explaining, then it seems that we require nothing more 
than the instrumental reliability of science to carry the explanation off. 
Indeed, anything more than that would be doing no explanatory work” 
(UA, 153).
Of course, none of this is to advocate any form of antirealism. As 
should by now be clear, Fine rejects this position just as vehemently. The 
implication of Fine’s (many) arguments, he claims, is to get us to see that 
we need not theorize about the sciences at all. As he puts it:
The attitude that marks NOA is just this: try to take science on its own terms, 
and try not to read things into science. If one adopts this attitude, then the 
global interpretations, the ‘isms’ of scientific philosophies, appear as idle 
overlays to science: not necessary, not warranted and, in the end, probably 
not even intelligible. (62)
Moreover, “the quickest way to get a feel for NOA is to understand it as 
undoing the idea of interpretation, and the correlative idea of invariance 
(or essence)” (62). Thus, NOA is a way of stepping around the dispute be-
tween realists and antirealists—a way of getting us to see that we need not 
disagree here. Our disagreements stem from an incessant need to charac-
terize our characterizations—to offer second-order theories of our scien-
tific practices. Our compulsion to determine the significance of science by 
interpreting it tells us more about our own insecurities than it will ever tell 
us about science. As Fine suggests, in a delightfully Wittgensteinian key, 
the realism/antirealism dispute does not demand resolution: it demands 
therapy.2
In the following section, I want to show that Heidegger’s position 
regarding the realist/antirealist dispute is much the same—despite some 
recent claims that Heidegger is himself a realist. This will serve both to (1) 
2 See (1984: 61): “I think we learn that such questions [about the fundamental sig-
nificance of science] really do not require an answer, but rather they call for an empathetic 
analysis to get at the cognitive (and temperamental) sources of the question, and then a 
program of therapy to help change all that.” 
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make more perspicuous the position I am advocating and (2) draw atten-
tion to the significant similarities between Heidegger and Fine.
III. Heidegger and the case for realism
In several recent publications, philosophers have attempted to make the 
case that Heidegger is, despite his own protestations otherwise, a real-
ist.3 The problem with these attempts, of course, is that the term ‘realist’ 
has no univocal meaning. It is precisely this problem which leads some 
to criticize Fine’s NOA as simply realism restated.4 In this section, I will 
attempt to sort out some recent claims about Heideggerian realism. I will 
do so with an eye on articulating what Fine and Heidegger share when it 
comes to accepting the world as we find it.
In Taylor Carman’s recent book, Heidegger’s Analytic, Carman 
claims that Heidegger is an ‘ontic realist.’ Ontic realism is the view that 
“occurrent entities exist and have a determinate spatiotemporal structure 
independently of us and our understanding of them” (157).5 As Carman 
claims, “Heidegger is a realist…in the sense that he takes occurrent enti-
ties to exist and to have a determinate causal structure independently of 
the conditions of our interpreting or making sense of them” (159).
This view is meant to be importantly different from the account of 
realism that Heidegger openly rejects in his discussion of the ontological 
problem of Reality in Being and Time. The view Heidegger rejects under 
the heading of realism, Carman contends, is the view that maintains that 
skepticism can be proven false, or, indeed, “any reductive naturalistic con-
ception of intelligibility in the absence of a phenomenological account of 
hermeneutic conditions” (164). If realism means, then, that the intelligibil-
ity of the world can be derived simply by examining the causal relations 
of occurrent objects, then realism must be false. As Carman (correctly) 
argues, the intelligibility of things is a transcendental question, not a ques-
tion about causes at all.
But this is not a rejection of the claim that occurrent objects exist 
independently of us—even if we must insist that an adequate explication 
of their intelligibility to us will require an explication of Dasein’s thrown 
Being-in-the-world. As Carman puts this point: “what Heidegger rejects, 
then, is the kind of metaphysical realism that […attempts…] to derive the 
3 Carman (2005), Tanzer (2002), Rudd (2003), Dreyfus and Spinosa (1999), etc.
4 Musgrave (1989).
5 The term ‘occurrent’ is Carman’s translation of choice for vorhanden. I have left this 
in all citations from Carman, though I will continue to speak of the present-at-hand when 
referring to occurrent entities.
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very intelligibility of entities as entities from their mere ontic structure” 
(165).
As far as realistic doctrines go, ontic realism (so far) does not seem to 
involve much. Ontic realism asserts that occurrent entities exist independ-
ently of human practices, despite the fact that the intelligibility of these 
entities is dependent on Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. This view has the 
advantage of making sense of Heidegger’s (frustrating) claim that “Being 
(not entities) is dependent on the understanding of Being” (255, H: 212). 
If Heidegger postulates that entities exist regardless of Dasein’s existence, 
then it seems he is indeed committed to something like ontic realism.
But it isn’t clear that the surface reading of this passage is the best one. 
Indeed, the surface reading is frustrating precisely because it is inconsist-
ent with the methodological stance of Sein und Zeit: namely, that ontology 
is only possible through phenomenology. If phenomenology is construed 
as the making manifest of things through the understanding of thrown 
Dasein, the claim that entities are not dependent on this understanding is 
obscure at best. If ontology requires phenomenology, Heidegger cannot 
postulate the existence of something of which Dasein is aware as utterly 
independent of Dasein’s understanding.
Thus, an alternative reading of the passage is required. One possibility 
here (compatible with Heidegger’s method) is to read the above remark as 
claiming that the notion of an occurrent entity is the notion of one that ex-
ists independently of us. To put it in Merleau-Ponty’s expression, we might 
claim that an occurrent object is one that is encountered as ‘in-itself-for-us’ 
(375). This is arguably what Heidegger has in mind when he claims that 
“once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as 
beings that already were” (269, H: 227). This does not mean that entities 
did already exist; it means, rather, that we understand them as having an 
existence independent of us. To put this in a slightly different idiom: part 
of the intelligibility of present-at-hand objects lies in thinking of them as 
having an independent existence. This is not equivalent to claiming they 
do have such an existence. Part of the meaning of the being of present-at-
hand entities is that they defy our projects, resists our concepts, and assert 
their independence from our understanding. But this must be construed as 
the mode of their disclosure—the way in which a range of things manifests 
itself—rather than as a feature of these entities an sich. To claim more 
than this, it seems, is simply to deny Heidegger’s central methodologi-
cal claim—namely, that ontology (an account of what is) is only possible 
through phenomenology (our understanding of things). To put it other-
wise: the causal structure just is one more structure of intelligibility.
Nevertheless, Carman is right to distinguish hermeneutic from causal 
conditions. He is also right to point out that from the fact that there are 
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certain conditions under which objects are intelligible to us (hermeneutic 
claim), it does not follow that without us there would be no objects (causal 
claim). This would be simply to state the antirealist view—a view which 
Heidegger also denies. This important point, however, is not the equiva-
lent of an assertion that entities do in fact exist (and have a spatiotem-
poral structure) apart from our understanding of them.6 As I understand 
him, Heidegger would reject this claim as quickly as he would reject its 
negation: it makes no sense to talk about things apart from Dasein’s un-
derstanding of them, as Dasein is that being through which the being of 
things is revealed.
It is for this reason that I must also reject Carman’s distinction of 
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand as a distinction between the 
agent-dependent and the agent-independent.7 To call something occur-
rent/present-at-hand means that we encounter it as resisting our current 
endeavors—as a discrete object with particular properties that do not hap-
pen to be conducive to our current goals.8 The mode of the thing’s dis-
closure is such that we view it as separate from us—as an independent 
thing in the world. But the fact that we view it in this way certainly does 
not make it so: encountering a thing as present-at-hand is just as depend-
ent on an agent as encountering that thing as ready-to-hand. It is in virtue 
of this, I take it, that we must characterize these two modes of beings as 
equi-primordial.
So, I do not think it is fruitful to insist that Heidegger is an ‘ontic real-
ist,’ at least when this expression is taken in the way that Carman stipu-
lates. Likewise, however, it is equally a mistake to think that Heidegger 
falls on the other side of this theoretical divide. Much as Heidegger fails to 
be a realist, so too does he fail to be an antirealist. Nevertheless, it is tempt-
ing to think of him in precisely these terms, as his account of the present-
at-hand as simply one way in which objects are for concernfully absorbed 
Dasein has heavy antirealist leanings. To see why we should not fall into 
antirealism, allow me to use some of Anthony Rudd’s recent work. 9
Rudd argues that 1) Heidegger is in fact compatible with a ‘global,’ 
metaphysical skepticism, and that 2) Heidegger presents us with a way to 
move beyond this skepticism without undermining its primary insights. 
Global metaphysical skepticism, Rudd stipulates, is not skepticism about 
6 One wants to ask what account of time and space Carman has in mind here—do 
occurrent objects exist in vulgar, everyday time? Are we to construe space as a Cartesian 
grid, the very one that Heidegger so harshly criticizes in Being and Time?
7 See Carman (2005: 190).
8 This is not to say that this is the only way to encounter the present-at-hand.
9 Rudd (2003).
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our everyday activities. The global, metaphysical skeptic can agree that 
there are facts—that things are a certain way. This sort of skepticism 
“[does] not work (at least, not in any direct way) to undermine everyday 
beliefs or even knowledge claims” (7). The primary point to be drawn 
from the arguments of the global, metaphysical skeptic is not that the met-
aphysical claims we make about the world are false. Rather, it is to show 
that we cannot determine what truth-value such judgments have. Global, 
metaphysical skepticism is thus a sort of pragmatic realism: we take as 
real those things that get us through the day. The skeptic “accepts the ex-
istence of all the ordinary objects we think of as existing, and need have no 
objection to the idea that these objects can be investigated in more detail 
by science” (36–37).
But when it comes to offering a meta-level claim about the status of 
everyday facts, the global metaphysical skeptic abstains from judgment. 
On Rudd’s view, this sort of skepticism is entirely defensible. No argu-
ment can move one from skepticism about the “fundamental ontological 
analysis” (16) of everyday facts to a robust metaphysical realism. The 
skeptic is an ontological agnostic.
Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein (Rudd claims) are compatible with 
this picture of skepticism, though they do offer us a means of going be-
yond this skepticism. This should not be surprising, as Rudd’s global met-
aphysical skepticism is essentially skepticism about philosophy—about 
whether or not a philosophical theory (or argument) could capture the na-
ture of things. Cast in this way, it is not only right but also obvious that 
Heidegger is amenable to this sort of ontological agnosticism: he is hostile 
to traditional theorizing in philosophy. This is sufficient, I think, for pre-
venting the collapse of Heideggerian thinking into traditional anti-realism: 
we recognize that Heidegger is skeptical about traditional, global accounts 
of phenomena; he is not skeptical about the everyday objects encountered 
in our living interaction with the world.
IV. The Common Ground: A Distaste for Second-Order Theory
One problem with calling Heidegger a realist, I take it, is that philosophers 
often mean varying things with the term. Carman describes Heidegger as 
an ‘ontic realist.’ Dreyfus and Spinosa defend a ‘robust realism’ about 
scientific practices by way of Heidegger. Tanzer likewise calls Heidegger 
a realist, but indicates that this must be understood in terms of the way in 
which the present-at-hand is already ‘contained’ within the ready-to-hand. 
Despite divergences in both arguments and conclusions, however, there is 
at least a common core to these ascriptions of realism. It is this common 
core, I think, that Heidegger wants to reject.
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Realism, at its most banal, is the assertion that there are objects the 
existence and nature of which do not depend on any human understanding 
of them. Dreyfus and Spinosa say precisely this: realism, as they char-
acterize it, rests upon what they call the ‘independence claim’: namely, 
“that order and its components exist independently of our minds or ways 
of coping” (49). Tanzer, likewise, argues that “if objects are what they 
are prior to Dasein’s existence, it will follow that they are what they are 
without Dasein, as the realist maintains, and so will possess a fundamental 
present-at-hand aspect” (44). Both of these accounts of realism accord 
with Carman’s claim, as we have seen, that “Heidegger is a realist…in 
the sense that he takes occurrent entities to exist and to have a determi-
nate causal structure independently of the conditions of our interpreting or 
making sense of them” (159).
Each of these accounts, though varying in detail and results, main-
tains, minimally, that realism is a way of characterizing the nature of the 
objects that we experience, and that this characterization of these objects 
goes beyond our modes of experiencing them. Tanzer (and others), for 
example, make much of Heidegger’s claim that “once entities have been 
uncovered, they show themselves precisely as beings that already were” 
(269, H: 227). As we have seen, however, this claim need not be read as 
a claim about the way objects exist apart from our experience of them. 
Indeed, to read the remark this way seems to ignore Heidegger’s insist-
ence that ontology is only possible through phenomenology. As I sug-
gested above in discussing Carman’s version of Heideggerian realism, one 
can profitably read Heidegger’s remark as a claim about the way objects 
present themselves to us—namely, as presenting themselves within our 
experience as objects having an existence apart from us (what Merleau-
Ponty helpfully calls the ‘in-itself-for-us’ (375)). It requires an additional 
step to then conclude that objects do in fact have such an independent 
existence. It is this step, I think, that is the hallmark of both realism and 
anti-realism: they both seek to make second-order claims about the way 
the world presents itself phenomenologically—claims that are themselves 
not phenomenological. Heidegger’s claim that objects present themselves 
as having an independent existence is a claim about our experience. To 
insist, based on this, that our experience does capture something about an 
independent reality (realism), or to claim that it does not (antirealism), is 
to move beyond phenomenology and the ordinary ways in which things 
present themselves. It is to move beyond that which shows itself to con-
clusions about that which shows itself. This desire for second-order char-
acterizations of our phenomenology is precisely what Heidegger rejects.
The desire to provide such second-order claims about objects—to 
characterize our first-order experience—stems, on Heidegger’s view, from 
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a naïve trust that we can defeat skepticism and prove that the world is ‘out 
there.’10 As Heidegger claims:
Along with Dasein as Being-in-the-world, entities within-the-world have 
in each case already been disclosed. This existential-ontological assertion 
seems to accord with the thesis of realism that the external world is really 
present-at-hand. In so far as this existential assertion does not deny that enti-
ties within-the-world are present-at-hand, it agrees—doxographically, as it 
were—with the thesis of realism in its results. But it differs in principle from 
every kind of realism; for realism holds that the reality of the ‘world’ not 
only needs to be proved but also is capable of proof. In the existential asser-
tion both of these positions are directly negated. (252; H: 207)
The two things to note here, of course, are that Heidegger rejects both 1) 
the view that the reality of the external world needs to be proved, and 2) 
the view that the reality of this world can be proved. The problem with a 
view (such as realism) that supports these two claims is that it begins on 
ontologically inadequate grounds. When we recognize our thrown being-
in-the-world, we are capable of rejecting the posturing of both realism and 
antirealism. In both cases, the view presupposed is that our encountering 
of things in the phenomenal field is somehow inadequate on its own—it 
requires a meta-analysis in order to clarify what it is that is being encoun-
tered. But this type of meta-analysis is hostile to the very project of phe-
nomenology—a project which is marked by the battle cry of ‘to the things 
themselves’! A meta-analysis serves only to obfuscate our direct contact 
with things as they reveal themselves to us. Indeed, as Heidegger remarks 
in numerous places, we are such that the Being of things is disclosed to 
us. We require no external account of this disclosure for it to occur. Con-
sider:
From the very beginning, Being-in-the-world is disposed to ‘take things’ 
in some way [Auffassen], to suppose, to be certain, to have faith—a way 
of behaving which itself is always a founded mode of Being-in-the-world. 
(250, H: 206)
Now, none of this is to say that characterizing phenomena is useless. If 
this were so Heidegger would have some explaining to do. What is here 
being denied is that we can go beyond the phenomena in order to charac-
terize the significance of the phenomena—a view that Heidegger rejects 
time and again. It is only when we attempt to investigate things apart 
from Dasein that questions of realism and antirealism emerge. Or, as 
Heidegger amusingly puts it: “The question of whether there is a world 
10 It is naïve because the very question of skepticism starts from a faulty picture of 
Dasein.
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at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised 
by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?” (247, 
H: 202).
By engaging in the existential analytic we are able to discern differ-
ent modes of Being—different ways in which the world presents itself to 
Dasein. We recognize things both as present-at-hand entities as well as ex-
isting within an equipmental totality. Thus far, no question about realism 
or antirealism has arisen. It is only when we ask ‘But how are things when 
Dasein is not encountering them?’ that we run into familiar problems. 
What Heidegger wants us to see is that this question itself is pointless, for 
we will never experience things as they are independently of us—even 
though we do experience things as having always already been present. 
What we must explain, Heidegger contends, is not how the world is apart 
from us, but why we insist on thinking of such a world at all.
Our task is not to prove that an ‘external world’ is present-at-hand or to 
show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-
world, has the tendency to bury the external world in nullity ‘epistemologi-
cally’ before going on to prove it. (250; H: 206)
It is in precisely this regard that we can see significant similarity between 
Fine’s NOA and Heidegger’s diagnosis of the realism/antirealism debate. 
Fine also rejects the view that a proof of the external world is possible. As 
he puts it:
There is no possibility for justifying the kind of externality that realism re-
quires, yet it may well be that, in fact, we cannot help yearning for just such 
a comforting grip on reality. (1202)
What we see in the case of both Heidegger and Fine is a recognition that 
the way we normally encounter things does not require an external meta-
analysis.
But, it might be objected, doesn’t Fine’s NOA commit us to some-
thing like a present-at-hand ontology—one which ignores the other modes 
of Being things have? Wouldn’t Heidegger object to simply accepting the 
present-at-hand?
The answer to this question is an unequivocal no. The present-at-hand 
is one fundamental way in which we encounter things. It is one way in 
which the Being of things reveals itself to us. It is not a mistake to ac-
knowledge this manner of Being; the mistake is to regard it as fundamen-
tal. Regarding the present-at-hand as fundamental, however, is not what 
scientists do—it is what philosophers of science do when they attempt to 
characterize science from a point external to its everyday practice. The 
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question posed is this: “do the present-at-hand entities described in sci-
entific practice exist in the world, independently of us?” To make any 
answer to this question, whether positive or negative, parasitic on ‘real-
ism’ (as either for it or against it) is to presuppose the primordiality of the 
present-at-hand, and hence to ignore the other ways in which the world 
can be revealed. The problem here is the presupposition that answering 
one question about the present-at-hand can effectively end the realism/
antirealism debate.
To correct this, we must investigate science as a practice—something 
that human being do, not as something that is reducible to a procedure for 
exposing the bare contours of the world. The aim of the practice of sci-
ence is to characterize the present-at-hand, to be sure, but it is a practice 
nevertheless. Like other practices, we can understand it in terms of the 
goals it hopes to achieve, the competence required to engage in it, and the 
way it fits into other aspects of our lived experience. One thing we can 
note about (some) scientific practices is that they enable us to engage in 
descriptions of things from a third-person perspective—but this certainly 
does not entail that our descriptions map onto the way things are inde-
pendently of our practices. To assert this would be simply to state realism, 
and this is precisely what Heidegger and Fine both want to avoid. But 
neither does recognizing science as a practice entail that our descriptions 
do not correspond to the world. The problem here is with our obsessive-
compulsive need to decide whether or not the present-at-hand are ‘real’ in 
some unspecified (and perhaps unintelligible) sense. The way to resolve 
this problem is to dissolve it—to recognize that our meta-descriptions of 
the way the world is disclosed in scientific practices will not itself matter 
to those practices.
The practice of science, like other practices, reveals things to us in 
a particular way. The mistake the realist makes is to suppose that this 
manner of revelation is somehow more fundamental than the other ways 
in which, as Heidegger would say, the Being of things manifests itself. 
We should appreciate that scientific practices reveal things (this is what 
we find in NOA), but we should not do so in a manner that excludes the 
recognition that things can be disclosed in multiple ways (or, as Sartre 
would put it, that phenomena are transcendent—that they go beyond any 
set of perceptions of them). Science is one manner in which the world is 
revealed—useful for many things, and more useful than other ways of en-
countering the world in certain respects—but it should not be regarded as 
the one and only way to encounter things—or, more carefully, as the one 
and only way things are.
It is this view, I think, which is both at the heart of Division I of Being 
and Time as well as at the core of Fine’s NOA: our attitude in approach-
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ing the practice of science ought to be one that acknowledges that science 
reveals certain things. But we should not then try to go beyond this recog-
nition and characterize the practice as a whole as that which enables us (in 
Richard Rorty’s phrase) to speak ‘Nature’s Own Language.’ We run into 
trouble only when we theorize about what we do, despite the fact that such 
theorizing is not necessary.11
Of course, the now-standard objection to this view is to claim refrain-
ing from characterizing the results of science prevents us from making 
progress within science: if we simply accept what scientists postulate as 
existing, without critical scrutiny, we will never be in a position to re-
vise our theoretical commitments in light of new evidence, new theory, or 
whatever.
This objection, I think, makes two crucial mistakes: first, it is, if the 
reader will permit me the term, narcissistic. Second, it presumes that all 
critique must be external critique. The objection is narcissistic because it 
accords too much importance to the philosopher’s reflection on a practice. 
I do not want to be misunderstood here: philosophical reflections are im-
portant, but they are not important because they determine the meaning 
of practices that enable philosophy to exist in the first place. The mistake 
is to think that the philosophical questions that arise out of a practice and 
in relation to it will then have a determinative say in what a practice in 
fact is. Though our characterization of our practices can affect these prac-
tices, it is a mistake to think that the practices themselves are somehow 
insufficient.12 The further thought that it is the job of the philosopher to 
complete a practice (such as science) is symptomatic of an inflated sense 
of self-importance.
But the error here is not simply a psychological one. There is also a 
logical problem. Science does not need external critique in thinking about 
its results. Part of the practice (or practices) of science is to subject data to 
virtually endless analysis. Indeed, it is partly because this is the nature of 
scientific activity that we have been led to offer the meta-analyses that we 
have. But a recognition of the procedures of scientific practice is no cause 
for theoretical exuberance. In fact, it is a cause to recognize that there is no 
11 Compare: “Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at 
what happens as a ‘proto-phenomenon.’ That is, where we ought to have said: this lan-
guage game is played” (Wittgenstein 1953: 167).
12 This was Russell’s mistake in thinking about the foundations of mathematics: he 
thought the reduction of mathematics to set theory was the only way to justify mathemat-
ics. But the practice speaks for itself. It raises questions, certainly, but it does not need a 
philosophical foundation. To put this point slightly differently: if our practices needed a 
philosophical foundation, they would not have survived as practices.
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need to theorize about the status of the results of science at all. We should 
acknowledge that science uncovers things in one particular way, and pass 
over the rest in silence.
One final objection to the position I have been defending is neces-
sary. For someone who advocates theoretical silence about science, I have 
been doing a lot of theorizing—and loudly. While there is probably no 
excuse for my behavior, I will nevertheless offer this one: in an academic 
landscape plagued with debates about realism and antirealism, and moreo-
ver one that often regards the respective traditions of Fine and Heidegger 
as utterly at odds with one another, it is useful to show that there might 
be a way around our current disagreements—one that builds a proverbial 
bridge across the English Channel. This exercise is important, I think, not 
only because Fine and Heidegger are up to the same thing (if what I have 
been arguing is correct), but also because they provide a way of easing 
extant tension in a heated debate between those who are desperate to use 
science in every avenue of human affairs, and those who think we will 
lose much in doing so. This, I trust, is reason enough to speak—and it is 
perhaps even reason enough to theorize.13
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